![]() Dependent upon imported food and raw materials and relying upon sea transportation to supply her armies at home and overseas, Japan lost the war because she lost command of the sea, and in doing so lost – to us – the island bases from which her factories and cities could be destroyed by air.įrom the earliest days of the war our submarines, operating offensively in the farthest reaches of the Pacific, exacted a heavy toll of Japanese shipping. By contrast with Germany, however, Japan’s armies were intact and undefeated and her air forces only weakened when she surrendered, but her navy had been destroyed and her merchant fleet had been fatally crippled. In the Pacific war, the power of our ground and strategic air forces, like sea power in the Atlantic, was an essential factor. Nevertheless, the surrender of the land sea, and air forces of the German Reich on was the direct result of the application of air power over land and the power of the Allied ground forces. Without command of the sea, this would not have been done. In the European war, sea power was an essential factor because of the necessity of transporting our entire military effort across the Atlantic and supporting it there. The war in Europe was primarily a ground and air war with naval support, while the war in the Pacific was primarily a naval war with ground and air support. The contrast between them is at once apparent. Both of these tasks have now been accomplished and we can view in clearer perspective the two major campaigns which led to victory. The major strategic decision of the war provided first for the defeat of Germany and then for the defeat of Japan. This being my last report, however, I am including herein my considered general comment and observation on the war as a whole. The present report is intended primarily to cover the period of the succeeding seven months, during which Germany Surrendered and the war with Japan came to an end. My two previous reports carried to 1 March 1945 the account of the development of our naval strength and the participation of the United States Navy in combat operations. Naval Vesels from all causes, 7 December 1941-1October 1945ĬOVER ART-Official U.S. VII-NAVAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR IIĪPPENDIX A-Status of major combatant ships of the Japanese navy at the conclusion hostilitiesĪPPENDIX B-Major combatant ships added to the United States Fleet, 7 December 1941-1 October 1945ĪPPENDIX C-Losses of U.S. ![]() Joint Operations in the Philippines and Borneoįast Carrier Force Preinvasion Operations Against Japan They exemplify the teamwork of all services which brought victory on both the European and Pacific fronts.įor the officers and men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, I am happy to report, at the end of the war, that the missions and tasks assigned all of them, singly and collectively, have been successfully accomplished.įast Carrier Force Operations in Support of Okinawa Invasion The significant role of amphibious operations in this war was strikingly portrayed in the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which were the outstanding operations of this type during the last months of the war. The Navy built and manned by the united efforts of this country continued to carry the action to the enemy, engaged him by sea and air, maintained control of the essential lanes of sea communication and transported men and supplies over all oceans to all theaters. This report covers the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945. Since the terminal date of my second report major hostilities on all fronts have terminated victoriously for the nations allied against the Axis powers, and I transmit to you herewith my third and final report of operations of the United States Navy in World War II. On 1 March of this year I presented to you my second annual report of the progress of our naval operations and the expansion of our naval establishment during the preceding year.
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